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ARE BONUSES COMPATIBLE WITH 
THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY? 
BY 
F. Case Whittemqre 
Executive Masters of Business Administration Program 
University of Richmond 
April 1990 
This paper examines the philosophy of Dr. W. Edwards 
Deming to determine what principles of that philosophy should 
apply to selecting a bonus compensation plan. All types of 
bonus plans, including the following incentive bonus plans 
individual incentive, group incentive, gain sharing, profit 
sharing and pay-for-knowledge are examined to determine which 
meet the Deming principles. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION . ...............•.............................. 1 
A. What Is the Deming Philosophy? ........................ l 
B. Who Is Dr. Deming? ................................... 4 
C. Purposes of this Paper . ............................... 6 
II. WHAT'S WRONG WITH TRADITIONAL COMPENSATION 
SYSTEMS AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS? .....................•.. ? 
A. Performance Appraisals Demoralize Most Employees ..•..• 9 
B. Employees' Efforts to Improve Their Work 
Practices May Hurt the Firm .........................• 11 
c. Performance Appraisals Encourage Mediocrity ........•. 12 
D. Pressure to Meet Goals May Cause 
Sub-Optimization . .................................... 12 
E. Performance Appraisals Inhibit Teamwork ...........••. 14 
F. Performance Appraisals Encourage Internal 
Competition . ......................................... 15 
G. Performance Appraisals Hinder Long-Term 
Planning . ............................................ 15 
H. Performance Appraisals Are Based on a 
Faulty Premise . ...................................... 16 
I. What Does Dr. Deming Recommend? ...................... 17 
III. SELECTED DEMING PRINCIPLES ................................ 19 
A. Avoid Internal Competition ..........................• 19 
B. Build Teamwork . ...................................... 19 
c. Seek Long-Term Continuous Improvement ................ 19 
D. Avoid Numerical Quotas and Goals ..................... 20 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
DESCRIPTION OF BONUS PLANS ................................ 22 
A. Thank-You Bonus . ..................................... 2 2 
B. Supplemental Bonus . .................................. 2 2 
c. Incentive Bonus ... .......................... 23 
1. Individual Incentive. ................... 2 3 
Small Group Incentive. . ...... . .................. 2 4 2. 
3. Gain Sharing ... . ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
4. Profit Sharing .... . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . 2 8 
5. Pay-for-Knowledge ............................... 29 
WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF BONUS PLANS AND ARE 
THEY COMPATIBLE WITH THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY? ............... 31 
A. Direct (improve profitability, productivity, 
quality) ..................... . . .................. 31 
1. Improve output of goods and services ............ 31 
2 . Reduce costs . •...•.......................•...... 31 
B. Indirect ........... . . .......................... 31 
1. Organizational change ........................... 31 
2. Employee matters ................................ 32 
WHICH BONUS PLANS ARE COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY? ............................... 33 
A. Thank-You Bonus ... ............................... 33 
1. Company-Wide . ................................... 3 3 
2 . Individual ...................................... 3 4 
B. Supplemental Bonus ................................... 35 
c. Incentive Bonus .. . ............................... 35 
1. Individual Incentive ............................ 35 
2. Small Group Incentive ........................... 36 
3. Gain Sharing ... •••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 6 
4. Prof it Sharing .... • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 8 
5. Pay-for-Knowledge. • •••••••••.•••.•.•••••••• 38 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 0 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. What Is the Deming Philosophy? 
The United States can thank the Japanese for finding a 
U.S. treasure, nurturing it to prominence in Japan and then 
re-exporting it to the U.S. That treasure is the Deming phi-
losophy, which was expounded by Dr. w. Edwards Deming. The 
backbone of the Deming philosophy is the following "14 Points 
for Management": 
1. Create constancy of purpose toward 
improvement of product and service, with the 
aim to become competitive and to stay in 
business, and to provide jobs. 
2. Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a 
new economic age. Western management must 
awaken to the challenge, must learn their 
responsibilities, and take on leadership for 
change. 
3. Cease dependence on inspection to 
achieve quality. Eliminate the need for 
inspection on a mass basis by building 
quality into the product in the first place. 
4. End the practice of awarding business on 
the basis of price tag. Instead, minimize 
total cost. Move toward a single supplier 
for any one item, on a long-term relationship 
of loyalty and trust. 
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5. Improve constantly and forever the 
system of production and service, to improve 
quality and productivity, and thus constantly 
decrease costs. 
6. Institute training on the job. 
7. Institute leadership . . The aim of 
supervision should be to help people and 
machines and gadgets to do a better job. 
Supervision of management is in need of 
overhaul, as well as supervision of 
production workers. 
8. Drive out fear, so that everyone may 
work effectively for the company . • . . 
9. Break down barriers between 
departments. People in research, design, 
sales, and production must work as a team, to 
foresee problems of production and in use 
that may be encountered with the product or 
service. 
10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and 
targets for the work force asking for zero 
defects and new levels of productivity. such 
exhortations only create adversarial 
relationships, as the bulk of the causes of 
low quality and low productivity belong to 
the system and thus lie beyond the power of 
the work force. 
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lla. Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the 
factory floor. Substitute leadership. 
b. Eliminate management by objective. 
Eliminate management by numbers, numeric~l 
goals. Substitute leadership. 
12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly 
worker of his right to pride of workmanship. 
The responsibility of supervisors must be 
changed from sheer numbers to quality. 
b. Remove barriers that rob people in 
management and in engineering of their right 
to pride of workmanship. This means, inter 
alia, abolishment of the annual or merit 
rating and of management by objective 
13. Institute a vigorous program of 
education and self-improvement. 
14. Put everybody in the company to work to 
accomplish the transformation. The 
transformation is everybody's job. 
(Deming 1986, pp 23-24). 
Dr. Deming also warns management to avoid the following 7 
"Deadly Diseases": 
1. Lack of constancy of purpose to plan 
product and service that will have a market 
and keep the company in business, and provide 
jobs. 
2. Emphasis on short-term profits: 
short-term thinking (just the opposite from 
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constancy of purpose to stay in business), 
fed by fear of unfriendly takeover, and by 
push from bankers and owners for dividends. 
3. Evaluation of performance, merit rating, 
or annual review. 
4. Mobility of management; job hopping. 
5. Management by use only of visible 
figures, with little or no consideration of 
figures that are unknown or unknowable. 
6. Excessive medical costs. 
7. Excessive costs of liability, swelled by 
lawyers that work on contingency fees. 
(Deming 1986, pp 97-98). 
Although Dr. Deming is sometimes called a quality guru, 
his philosophy is actually much broader than just ensuring 
that products meet specifications through the use of statis-
tical process control. The main purpose of the Deming philoso-
phy is to transform management so that it will lead the way to 
improved quality, productivity and profitability over the long 
term. 
B. Who Is Dr. Deming? 
Dr. W. Edwards Deming was a statistician in the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau before World War II. He helped improve the quality 
of production during World War II. Afterwards, American indus-
try was so busy riding the tidal wave of pent-up demand and 
technological superiority developed by wartime necessity that 
it was unreceptive to the Deming philosophy (Grayson 1988, p. 
3 09) • 
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The Japanese, however, were desperate. Their country and 
its economy were in ruins, their productivity was only 14% of 
U.S. productivity (Grayson 1988, p. 61), and "made in Japan" 
meant inferior quality. The Japanese began an intense search 
for solutions. They made many trips to learn about U.S. 
industry. In July 1950, the Union of Japanese Scientists and 
Engineers invited Dr. Deming to give an eight-day course to 
340 Japanese research workers, engineers and plant managers. 
In addition, he gave a special session to senior executives 
from 50 leading Japanese manufacturing firms. They listened 
well and, with continuing guidatice by Dr. Deming and other 
quality experts such as Dr. Joseph M. Juran, accomplished a 
remarkable transformation of their manufacturing industries 
into major world competitors. 
The Japanese did not forget Dr. Deming's contribution. In 
1950, the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers estab-
lished the Deming Prize to commemorate his contributions to 
quality improvement in Japan. Each year the Deming Prize is 
awarded to a small number of corporations and plants, and 
occasionally to individuals for unusual quality achievements. 
The Deming Prize is now the "most coveted and prestigious 
award for quality in Japan" (Grayson 1988, p. 309). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s when Japanese companies 
were rapidly gaining U.S. market shares with superior quality 
products, U.S. companies began to recognize that the post-war 
honeymoon was over. They began a frantic search for ways to 
improve the quality of their products. In a reversal of the 
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late 1940s and early 1950s, U.S. managers went to Japan to 
learn how the Japanese achieved such high quality. Some found 
that the answer was right at home--Dr. w. Edwards Deming. In 
the last decade he has become one of the leading spokesmen for 
the growing quality movement in the U.S. 
c. Purposes of this Paper 
Dr. Deming states that, by implementing his 14 Points, 
management will lead the way to improved quality, productivity 
and profits over the long term. However, his writings give no 
explicit guidance on whether management should share the 
improved prof its with the employees, such as through a bonus 
system. 
This leads to the two r·.irposes of this paper. The first 
is to examine the Deming philosophy to determine what princi-
ples should apply to selecting a bonus plan that is compatible 
with the Deming philosophy. These principles are derived from 
studying Dr. Deming's writings, especially his criticisms of 
the traditional employee compensation system that bases pay 
raises on annual employee performan~e appraisals. 
The second purpose is to use those principles to evaluate 
each type of bonus plan to determine which plans are compati-
ble with the Deming philosophy. This will provide guidance to 
a firm that is implementing the Deming philosophy and wants to 
select a bonus plan to share the improved profits with its 
employees. 
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II. WHAT'S WRONG WITH TRADITIONAL COMPENSATION 
SYSTEMS AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS? 
The problem with traditional compensation systems, accord-
ing to Dr. Deming, is that most pay raises are closely linked 
to performance appraisals. His criticisms of performance 
appraisals and their linkage to pay raises are discussed in 
this section. 
Dr. Deming's distaste for performance appraisals is summa-
rized in the following excerpts from his writings: 
The most powerful inhibitor to quality 
and productivity in the Western World is the 
so-called merit system or annual appraisal of 
people. What it does is to destroy people. 
Destruction of the people in a company leads 
to destruction of the company. 
(Deming 1~8 , p. 2). When discussing the Western system of 
annual performance appraisals and merit ratings, Dr. Deming 
wrote: 
It nourishes short-term performance, 
annihilates long-term planning, builds fear, 
demolishes teamwork, nourishes rivalry and 
politics. 
It leaves people bitter, crushed, 
bruised, battered, desolate, despondent, 
dejected, feeling inferior, some even de-
pressed, unfit for work for weeks after re-
ceipt of rating, unable to comprehend why 
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they are inferior. It is unfair, as it as-
cribes to the people in a group differences 
that may be caused totally by the system that 
they work in. 
Basically, what is wrong is that the 
performance appraisal or merit rating focuses 
on the end product, at the end of the stream, 
not on leadership to help people. This is a 
way to avoid the problems of people. A 
manager becomes, in effect, manager of 
defects. 
The idea of a merit rating is alluring. 
The sound of the words captivates the 
imagination: pay for what you get; get what 
you pay for; motivate people to do their 
best, for their own good. 
The effect is exactly the opposite of 
what the words promise. Everyone propels 
himself forward, or tries to, for his own 
good, on his own life preserver. The organi-
zation is the loser. 
Merit rating rewards people that do well 
in the system. It does not reward attempts 
to improve the system. Don't rock the boat. 
(Deming 1986, p. 102). 
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Tom Peters (1985) expressed his agreement: 
w. Edwards Deming, the quality guru, 
says performance appraisal is the No. 1 man-
agement problem in the United states. He 
contends that it takes the average American 
employee six months to "recover" from the 
typical performance appraisal. That may be 
an understatement. 
A. Performance Appraisals Demoralize Most Employees 
The biggest problem with performance appraisals is the 
psychological effect that they have on most employees. Most 
people like to feel good about themselves. Therefore, most 
consider themselves to be in the top one third or one half of 
their peer group. 
Most performance appraisals require each employee to be 
placed in one of at least three groups. Worse still, some 
systems demand a forced ranking of all employees being rated. 
For example, in a pay-for-performance system that was head-
lined in the January 26, 1988 edition of the Wall Street Jour-
nal, General Motors required its supervisors to place their 
employees in the top 10%, the next 25%, the next 55% and the 
bottom 10% of their group. The system lasted only one year 
and was replaced by a more flexible system. The Buick-
Oldsmobile-Cadillac Group went even further and did away with 
forced ratings (Moen 1989, p. 65). 
Whether the performance appraisal system requires the 
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employees to be placed in a few groups or a forced ranking, 
most of the people in the top one third to one half will be 
happy. However, some will be disenchanted or, at least uncom-
fortable. The happy ones are those who believe that the ap-
praisal system is fair, objective and consistent (Scholtes 
1987, p. 11). This group probably thinks, "I deserved it." 
The remainder of the top one third will be disenchanted 
because they do not think the appraisal system is fair, objec-
tive and consistent. Recognizing that the appraisal system is 
somewhat like a lottery, they are not able to enjoy their high 
rating because they realize their turn to be in the lower two 
thirds may come next year (Scholtes 1987, p. 11; Winstanley 
1982' p. 38). 
The psychological state of the employees who are placed in 
the lower one half to two thirds is described by Peter R. 
Scholtes as follows: 
For almost all of those judged to be in 
the lower two thirds or lower half, the 
[appraisal] will probably come as a shock. 
The news from the evaluator will be disillu-
sioning and depressing, especially if the one 
evaluated believes the appraisal system to be 
fair, objective and consistent. Of course, 
if he or she does not see the [appraisal] 
process to be fair, the worker will be bitter 
and cynical about the judgement. 
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This disillusionment can be devastat-
ing. Drained of self-esteem and a good 
self-image, workers' performance may get 
worse. They will feel less self-confident 
and grow more dependent on supervision. They 
will be fearful, trying to second guess what 
the supervisor is thinking. This leads to 
even worse performance, fulfilling the evalua-
tor's prophecy. 
(Scholtes 1987, p. 11). Tom Peters says it even more 
strongly, "there is simply nothing dumber (and more debilitat-
ing) than labeling one-third to one-half of your people 
losers, which is exactly what virtually all forced-rankings 
do" (1987, pp 495-97; see also Hughes 1986). 
B. Employees' Efforts to Improve Their Work Practices May 
Hurt the Firm 
Some employees in the bottom half or two thirds who are 
not too disillusioned will try to figure out how to change 
their work practices so that they will get a better 
performance appraisal. They may emulate those who were in the 
top group. However, what is good for one employee may be 
inappropriate for another employee. Therefore the employees' 
attempt to improve performance may actually degrade their 
performance. Of course, that would hurt both the employees 
and their firm (Deming 1986, p. 103). 
For example, suppose salesman A, who has a few large ac-
counts, got a high rating and salesman B, who has many, widely 
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dispersed, small accounts, got a low rating. B wants to 
improve his rating and decides to emulate A. B observes that 
A makes many trips to visit his accounts. B concludes that he 
should travel more, rather than continue to handle his 
accounts primarily by phone. B increases his travel but his 
sales volume drops because, while he travels and visits a few 
customers, he ignores most of his former customers. B's next 
performance rating is even worse than his previous one and his 
firm suffers because of lost sales. 
c. Performance Appraisals Encourage Mediocrity 
Many performance appraisal systems require the employee 
and supervisor to agree at the beginning of the year on cer-
tain goals by which the employee's performance will be mea-
sured. At the outset, the employee negotiates hard to ensure 
that he has "safe" goals, ones that he is sure to accomplish. 
However, if he were fully motivated, he might far exceed those 
goals. Instead, the employee is likely to just exceed the 
first year's goals and hold in reserve any potential gains to 
ensure he will have goals that he can meet during the follow-
ing year. Thus the firm loses because performance improve-
ments are delayed so that the employee can set and achieve 
goals each year (Scholtes 1987, p. 10; Brophy 1986). 
D. Pressure to Meet Goals May cause Sub-Optimization 
When an employee is having or anticipates having difficul-
ty meeting a goal, that employee probably will take the neces-
sary steps to ensure that he meets his goal, in order to get a 
good performance appraisal. Those necessary steps may put 
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pressure on the system that causes distortions elsewhere in 
the firm. Presumably there is some gain to the firm from 
having the individual meet his goal. However, if that gain is 
less than the losses to the firm caused by the distortions, 
then there has been sub-optimization. 
For example, to meet a quarterly sales objective, a 
salesman may reduce prices in order to get customers to buy 
early thereby sacrificing sales in the following quarter and 
reducing the profitability on the accelerated sales. In 
another example, managers in a New York bank focussed 
attention on direct labor costs in its back office by 
measuring the number of transactions per employee and ma.~·e 
that factor a large part of the bonuses paid to line 
managers. As a result, line managers computerized every-
thing. The number of transactions per employee went up and 
staff shrunk, but data processing came under heavy pressure. 
It boosted its staff, as well as its spending on hardware and 
software. The bank did not know if the savings in labor cost 
in the back office compared to the additional costs in the 
data processing department (Chew 1988, p. 111}. In a final 
example, a manufacturer of engine blades adopted a plan to 
reward its workers for increased production. Unfortunately 
the plan did not take quality into account. The employees 
increased production dramatically but many of the blades had 
to be reworked at great expense to the company (Perry 1988, p. 
52} • 
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E. Performance Appraisals Inhibit Teamwork 
As technology and business become more complex and sophis-
ticated, more tasks are being done by teams rather than by 
individuals. However, most performance appraisals are don~ on 
an individual basis. This encourages the individual to do 
whatever is necessary to improve his chances of getting a good 
appraisal even if it hurts team unity or team output. The 
issue may be as simple as who should get credit for a new 
idea. From the standpoint of the firm, it makes little 
difference who had the new idea. However, it may be very 
important to certain team membe~~ in their performance 
appraisal whether they can take credit. The ensuing struggle 
for credit does not help the firm. In fact, it probably hurts 
the firm because it causes animosity within the team and 
distracts them from their primary efforts (Deming 1986, p. 
107) • 
This problem was well summarized by David c. Couper 
(1988), chief of police of Madison, Wisconsin, who wrote: 
Most work is the product of a group of 
people--the process of rewarding an indi-
vidual requires a pretense that the indi-
vidual is working alone. Rewarding indi-
viduals encourages "lone rangers" and is a 
divisive influence in every organization. 
You cannot measure people apart from the 
systems in which they work. Performance 
evaluation, and tying pay to it, requires a 
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process of appraisal that is fair, depend-
able, consistent and objective--otherwise, it 
will be seen as rewarding favorites at best, 
or a charade at worst. such objectivity and 
consistency in any known performance evalua-
tion system today simply does not exist. 
F. Performance Appraisals Encourage Internal Competition 
Ideally a firm would like to focus all of its employees' 
efforts on contributing to the goal of outperforming rival 
firms. However, most employees, who are not already disillu-
sioned by the system, want thei~ performance appraisal to be 
in the top third. Obviously they all cannot be there. None-
theless, they will try and that causes internal competition. 
That competition is usually to the firm's detriment for a 
variety of reasons, the most important of which may be the 
loss of the competitive energy wasted on a fellow employee 
rather than being directed at other firms as well as the 
unhealthy interpersonal conflict generated by the internal 
competition (Gabris, Mitchell and McLemore 1985, p. 232). 
G. Performance Appraisals Hinder Long-Term Planning 
In an effort to improve the fairness and accuracy of per-
formance appraisals, the evaluators try to find objective 
measures that are easily defined and evaluated. Because, as 
discussed above, most traditional pay systems are based in 
part on performance appraisals, performance goals usually have 
a term of one year or less in order to support the pay sys-
tem. Together these factors tend to foster short-term think-
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ing at the expense of long-term planning. Of course, without 
adequate long-term planning, a firm is probably doomed to 
mediocre performance, if it survives at all. 
Arguably, this problem of performance appraisals 
focusing efforts on short-term goals at the expense of 
long-term planning could have been included under the heading 
of sub-optimization. However, it is treated separately be-
cause of its importance. 
H. Performance Appraisals Are Based on a Faulty Premise 
The performance appraisal system is based on the assump-
tion that each employee can substantially improve his perf or-
mance. Otherwise, there would be no point in expending the 
time and effort necessary to do the appraisals, conduct the 
interviews, and administer the system. However, researchers 
estimate that "in most systems 80 to 85 percent of the 
problems are with the system and 15 to 20 percent are with the 
worker" (Tribus 1982, p. 5, emphasis in original; see also 
Gitlow 1987, p. 74). 
Thus, an employee may be making extraordinary efforts to 
improve his performance. However, because of external 
limitations such as defective machinery or improper working 
conditions that limit the employee's performance, the employee 
may neither be able to improve performance nor meet 
management's goals. In such case, a below average appraisal 
is more a condemnation of management's failure to correct the 
limiting factor than it is of the employee's performance. 
Management's failure to recognize the importance of factors 
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beyond the employee's control often lead to frustration by 
both management and the employee. If it continues, the employ-
ee will become cynical and bitter toward the appraisal system 
and maybe toward the firm. 
I. What Does Dr. Deming Recommend? 
Dr. Deming's solution to the problem of performance ap-
praisals is to just stop doing them, or at least stop linking 
pay raises to performance appraisals. 
The most prevalent reason for performance appraisals has 
been to establish a basis for each employee's next pay raise. 
Certainly there are a number of other reasons for performance 
appraisals (Scholtes 1987, pp 24-33). However, as long as pay 
is linked to performance appraisals, the employee is so con-
cerned about the next pay raise that it is very difficult for 
the employee to focus effectively on the other issues or 
messages that the evaluator wants to discuss (Moen 1989, p. 
62). Furthermore, given the long standing linkage of perfor-
mance appraisals to pay increases, it is very difficult to 
convince employees that performance appraisals are no longer 
the basis for pay increases. Therefore, this writer believes 
that formal performance appraisals should be eliminated for at 
least two years before they can be successfully reinstated for 
reasons other than pay raises. 
The need for managers and supervisors to give feedback and 
guidance to their employees continues and has increased impor-
tance under the Deming philosophy. Therefore, the formal 
performance appraisals should be replaced by frequent, infer-
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mal coaching sessions in which managers and supervisors give 
feedback, both good and bad. Also, the sessions should be the 
opportunity for the supervisor and manager to learn how to 
improve the system so the employee may be more productive 
(Deming 1986, pp 115-19; Finley 1988; Peters 1987, p. 495). 
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III. SELECTED DEMING PRINCIPLES 
Based on Dr. Deming's writings and the previous analysis 
of his criticisms of performance appraisals and their linkage 
to pay raises, the following principles of the Deming philoso-
phy are the most important for evaluating the various types of 
bonus plans discussed in the following sections. 
A. Avoid Internal Competition 
Previously, we discussed how employee appraisals cause 
internal competition that generally hurts employee performance 
and morale, and which, in turn, hurts the firm. Thus if a 
bonus system is going to work, it must be structured to avoid 
internal competition. 
B. Build Teamwork 
Under the Deming philosophy, there are many aspects to 
building teamwork, not just reducing internal competition. 
One aspect is breaking down barriers, such as internal competi-
tion and corporate inhibitions to communications between orga-
nizational units. A second is encouraging cooperation between 
individual employees, work groups, divisions, departments and 
even between suppliers and customers. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, teamwork means using the "minds of many" to 
solve problems. 
c. Seek Long-Term Continuous Improvement 
As discussed previously, a bonus plan should try to 
achieve long-term, continuous improvement and avoid the tempta-
tion to focus on short-term gains (Deming 1986, pp 49-52). 
For example, inspecting output is usually "too late, 
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ineffective and costly" (Deming 1986, pp 28-29). Such inspec-
tion just separates good output from bad; it does not improve 
the process. Under such a system, the only way to ensure the 
quality of products shipped is to carefully cull defective 
output from good output. Mass inspection is very expensive 
because of the labor required plus the defective items must be 
discarded or reworked. 
Under the Deming philosophy, there would be two important 
differences. First, all employees dealing with the process 
would be trying to determine ways to improve it (Deming 1986, 
pp 49-52). Second, to the extent possible, there would be 
upstream sampling to provide early detection if the process 
gets out of statistical control and to allow the employees to 
correct the process to minimize production of defective 
items. Together these differences illustrate how continuous 
improvement can eliminate the need for expensive mass inspec-
tions. 
D. Avoid Numerical Quotas and Goals 
Numerical quotas and goals act as limits rather than incen-
tives. As an example, consider production work standards, 
which are usually set for the average worker. This means that 
half are capable of producing more than the standard but they 
do not because of peer pressure. The other half cannot make 
the standard, so they are dissatisfied and may leave the 
company. The company loses due to lost production by the 
above-average group and high turnover in the below-average 
group. 
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Similarly, management goals may keep managers from reach-
ing their full potential because they stop or slow down when 
they reach their goal (Deming 1986, pp 70-77). 
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF BONUS PLANS 
This section describes the various bonus plans to lay a 
foundation for applying the selected Deming principles dis-
cussed in the previous section. Bonus plans come in what 
Joyce Nilsson Orsini (1987) has classified as three types: 
thank-you, supplemental and incentive. 
A. Thank-You Bonus 
Thank-you bonuses can be sub-divided in two types. The 
first, the company-wide bonus, is usually given annually at 
the end of the year as a thank-you for service during the 
year. 
No strings are attached. The amount of the 
bonus is usually tied to company profits or 
sales and will vary with individual employ-
ees' salaries. No attempt is made to distin-
guish between good and bad employees. Every-
one shares in the bonus. 
(Orsini 1987, p. 180). 
The second type of thank-you bonus, the individual bonus, 
is awarded for some singularly important contribution to the 
company. It may be made at any time and is not planned by 
management. Therefore, it is not anticipated by the employees 
(Orsini 1987, p. 180). 
B. Supplemental Bonus 
Supplemental bonuses are usually designed to augment the 
salaries of the chief executive officer or other senior offic-
ers whose salaries have leveled off or are at the top of their 
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range. Sometimes it is easier to convince the board of 
directors to distribute a one year bonus that is a fraction of 
the profits in a good year than it is to convince the board 
that base salaries should be raised. Often supplemental bo-
nuses are recommended to the board on the basis that the se-
nior officers receiving them will work harder to increase 
prof its in the future so that they may receive future bo-
nuses. Thus, the supplemental bonus is often just a disguised 
incentive bonus. 
c. Incentive Bonus 
Incentive bonuses may have any of a myriad of structures. 
The common feature of all incentive bonus plans is that extra 
pay is given either for exceeding one's own predetermined 
goals or for out-performing some other group or individual 
when measured by predetermined criteria. Incentive bonuses 
can be divided into five types: 
Individual incentive 
Small group incentive 
Gain sharing 
Profit sharing 
Pay-for-knowledge 
1. Individual Incentive 
An individual incentive bonus is the most basic. The 
employee receives additional pay for exceeding a predetermined 
goal, such as total sales, amount of production, good atten-
dance, low number of defective items or low scrap rate. In 
its most competitive form, an employee may receive a bonus for 
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exceeding fellow employees' performance as measured by the 
same criteria. 
An individual incentive bonus may be made as fre-
quently as weekly or as seldom as once a year. Wageroll em-
ployees tend to receive their incentive bonus more frequently 
than salaried employees. A study by Carla O'Dell (1987) 
showed that 28% of American companies had individual incentive 
pay plans. The study indicated that the use of individual 
incentive bonuses for hourly workers was decreasing and its 
use for sales support staff, professional workers, managers 
and supervisors was increasing. Approximately half of the 
company's surveyed indicated that they planned to increase the 
use of individual incentive bonuses over the next five years 
for those categories of employees (pp 58-61). 
2. Small Group Incentive 
Small group incentive bonuses reflect the fact that 
recently more and more work is done by groups rather than by 
individuals. Thus, if a group's performance exceeds its work 
standards or goals, it is rewarded with an incentive bonus. 
Also a small group incentive bonus may be paid to the group 
that exceeds other groups' performance as measured by predeter-
mined criteria. Group incentive bonuses may be paid as fre-
quently as weekly and as seldom as annually. Approximately 
14% of American companies use small group incentive bonuses 
and this figure is growing. Of those companies that have 
small group incentive bonus plans, 34% reported that they give 
an equal number of dollars to each employee in the group and 
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30% reported that each employee got an equal percentage of his 
or her base earnings. The other 36% reported distribution on 
some other formula (O'Dell 1987, p. 54). 
3. Gain Sharing 
The concept of gain sharing was conceived in the 
1930s by Joseph N. Scanlon, who was a local union president at 
a steel mill that was on the verge of closing because of compe-
tition by more efficient companies. After extensive discus-
sions between the United steelworkers and his company manage-
ment, they adopted Scanlon's plan to reduce labor costs by 
tying wages directly to productivity. The workers base pay 
was reduced, but they received a bonus in proportion to the 
extent productivity exceeded a predetermined level. The 
Scanlon Plan is credited with improving the plant's 
productivity and saving it from liquidation (DeBettignies 
1989, pp 287-88). 
Although gain sharing plans are not commonly thought 
of as incentive bonuses, they should be because they have all 
the elements of incentive bonuses--additional money is paid 
for superior performance in order to encourage even better 
performance. In fact, gain sharing plans could be called 
large group incentive bonuses except they cover larger organi-
zational units--a whole plant, a division or even a whole 
company. The optimum size was thought to be 500-1,000 employ-
ees (Schuster 1987, p. 20). Surprisingly, research by O'Dell 
(1987) determined that the average number of employees in gain 
sharing plans was 5,220 with the largest being 94,000 (p. 35). 
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In 1987, approximately 13% of American companies had gain 
sharing plans and that figure was growing {O'Dell 1987, p. 
8). Nearly 35% of the firms using gain sharing plans reported 
that all employees in their organizational unit are given the 
gain sharing reward {O'Dell 1987, p. 36). Payments are made 
weekly, monthly, quarterly or annually. 
To determine whether and how much money should be 
distributed under a gain sharing plan, there must be a for-
mula. Probably there are nearly as many formulas as there are 
gain sharing plans. Most of the formulas can be divided into 
two groups. First, physical formulas "reward employees for 
improving the relationship between physical units of output 
and physical units of input," for instance, hours of labor or 
tons of raw material (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12). Improshare, 
which was developed by Mitchell Fein, is the best known gain 
sharing plan based on a physical formula. It is a characteris-
tic (but not a criticism) of physical formulas that the organi-
zational unit may earn a payment under the plan, because of 
high production, even though the company earned little, if 
any, profit (e.g., due to a price decrease) during the 
applicable period (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12). 
The second group of gain sharing plans use financial 
formulas. In these formulas, the payment is based primarily 
on the financial performance of the organizational unit or the 
whole company. The formula may still relate output to input, 
but it does so in terms of dollars, such as the ratio of sales 
to payroll. 
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The Scanlon Plan and the Rucker Plan are the best 
known gain sharing plans that use financial formulas. The 
Scanlon Plan rewards employees for improving the ratio of 
payroll costs to sales value of production (sales adjusted for 
inventory changes). The Rucker Plan is a bit more complex, 
basing bonuses on improvements in the ratio of payroll costs 
to value added (sales value of production less purchased mate-
rials and services) . As with any financially based system, 
bonuses generated under these plans are affected by changes in 
selling price and product mix as well as by productivity im-
provements. 
The Rucker formula inserts an additional element into 
the gain sharing picture. Since gains are measured in terms 
of improvements in value added, bonuses may be earned by em-
ployees through reductions in purchased materials and services 
as well as through improvements in labor productivity. The 
Rur.ker Plan is therefore suited to manufacturing organizations 
where there are significant opportunities for scrap reduction 
or energy conservation (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12). 
The philosophical differences between the two types 
of formulas are that physical formulas tend to emphasize fac-
tors that are more likely to be within the employees' con-
trol. The financial formulas are based on the concept that 
all employees in an organization have a common economic fate 
so their compensation should rise and fall with that of the 
organization (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12). 
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Recently, a third group of formulas is emerging. 
This group involves not just one measure of performance, but a 
series of factors. Thus, employee attention is drawn to a 
more representative array of critical issues affecting the 
organizational unit's performance, such as production cost, 
quality, delivery, inventory and safety (Belcher 1986, p. 
2-13). 
4. Profit Sharing 
Profit sharing is also a form of incentive bonus 
because a bonus is paid when the company's performance meets 
or exceeds certain predetermined levels in order to induce 
even better performance. Profit sharing is the ultimate finan-
cially based gain sharing plan. Gain sharing and profit shar-
ing differ primarily in emphasis. Most gain sharing plans 
seek productivity gains, while profit sharing emphasizes 
improved profitability. In 1987, 32% of American companies 
had profit sharing plans (O'Dell 1987, p. 8). 
The roots of profit sharing can be traced to an 1887 
Procter & Gamble program that: 
divided profits between the company and its 
workers in the same proportion that labor 
costs bore to total costs (in an era, remem-
ber, when labor costs were a much bigger 
slice of the pie than today). That is, if 
wages were 50 percent of all costs, the work-
ers' bonus would be one-half of profits. 
President Cooper Procter stated at the time: 
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"The chief problem of big business today is 
to shape its policies so that each worker 
will feel that he is a vital part of his 
company with a personal responsibility for 
its success and a chance to share in that 
success." 
(Peters 1987, p. 333, emphasis added by Peters). 
Historically, profit sharing bonuses were usually 
distributed once a year in the form of company stock that was 
placed in the retirement fund. Because such distributions had 
such a remote impact on employees, they had little, if any, 
motivational value. 
Recently, there is a growing number of companies that 
are paying prof it sharing bonuses to employees in cash 
(Belcher 1986, pp 2-13). Although this change is an attempt 
to increase the motivational value of profit sharing bonuses, 
i~s chances of success are dubious. When the profit sharing 
bonus is paid just once a year and usually at least several 
weeks after the close of the fiscal year, the connection be-
tween the year's efforts and the bonus is sufficiently attenu-
ated that any incentive is probably lost. 
5. Pay-for-Knowledge 
Under a pay-for-knowledge plan, an employee gets a bonus 
in the form of a raise each time he or she demonstrates prof i-
ciency either in a higher skill level within a current job or 
in a new job. Usually there are some restrictions on how 
frequently a person can obtain a pay-for-knowledge raise. The 
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rationale for a pay-for-knowledge system is that it rewards 
employees who are self-motivated enough to learn new skills. 
The firm benefits from having a more highly skilled work force 
that can readily move from job to job as production schedules 
and absenteeism demand (Jenkins 1985, pp 121-24). 
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V. WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF BONUS PLANS AND ARE 
THEY COMPATIBLE WITH THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY? 
All bonus plans ultimately have one purpose--to improve 
the long term economic well-being of the firm. This is appro-
priate because that purpose is in furtherance of the firm's 
primary functions, which are to increase shareholder value and 
to maintain and create economically viable employment. Some 
of the stated purposes of bonus plans have a fairly direct 
impact on the firm's economic well-being and for others the 
impact is indirect. More specifically, the impacts on the 
organization include the following: 
A. Direct (improve profitability, productivity, quality 
and competitiveness) 
1. Improve output of goods and services 
a. Increase production 
b. Reduce defective items 
2. Reduce costs 
a. Reduce cost of labor and benefits 
b. Reduce waste 
c. Reduce energy costs 
d. Reduce inefficiency 
e. Gain flexibility to reduce labor costs 
easily when business is doing poorly 
B. Indirect 
1. organizational change 
a. Foster individual, team, group and interde-
partmental cooperation 
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b. Reinforce employee involvement 
c. Spread decision-making 
2. Employee matters 
a. Reward employee suggestions and creativity 
b. Increase employee skills 
c. Attract most talented employees 
d. Reduce absenteeism 
e. Reduce turnover 
f. Reduce layoffs 
g. Reduce grievances 
The overall purpose of improving the economic 
well-being of the firm and the more specific purposes listed 
above are all compatible with the Deming philosophy. The only 
incompatibility might be if the purpose of a bonus plan could 
be interpreted as promoting a quick (but usually temporary) 
increase in profits rather than sustainable, long-run profit-
ability (Deming 1986, pp 99-101; Roberts 1988, p. 2). 
Thus studying the purposes of bonus plans does not 
help us determine which bonus plans are compatible with the 
Deming philosophy and which are not. 
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VI. WHICH BONUS PLANS ARE COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY? 
In this section, the selected Deming principles discussed 
in Section III are used to evaluate each of the bonus plans 
described in Section IV. 
A. Thank-You Bonus 
1. Company-Wide 
The company-wide thank-you bonus is compatible with 
the Deming philosophy. It shares with the employees the 
economic gains realized by the company without causing 
internal competition so long as the bonus is paid in what the 
employees perceive as a fair and equitable manner. This 
usually means that, whatever formula is used to distribute the 
bonus, it is applied company-wide, or at least it is the same 
for all employees within a business unit if there are 
independent business units within the corporation. 
In addition, a company-wide thank-you bonus does not 
violate the other three Deming principles. In fact, such a 
bonus may reinforce company efforts to encourage teamwork and 
long-term continuous improvement. Finally, even if the group 
that determines how to distribute the bonus uses a numerical 
formula, the last Deming principle (avoid numerical quotas and 
goals) will not be violated if the employees are not given the 
formula far enough ahead of time that they can adjust their 
behavior in an attempt to enlarge their share of the bonus 
pool. 
It is interesting to note that many Japanese firms 
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use the company-wide thank-you bonus. Bonuses are paid twice 
a year, in August just before the summer holiday and at the 
first of the year when the Japanese buy New Year's gifts. On 
an annualized basis, the bonuses average 4.7 months salary, 
which is 28% of the workers' total income (Schultz 1985, pp 
8-9). 
2. Individual 
Whether an individual thank-you bonus is compatible 
with the Deming philosophy is not as clear as the company-wide 
bonus. Although the individual bonus is unplanned and, there-
fore, is not likely to cause employees to maneuver in order to 
earn it, the public act of awarding an individual bonus could 
be contrary to the first twu principles (avoid internal 
competition and build teamwork). Two groups could be hurt by 
awarding such a bonus. The first includes employees who think 
their efforts were at least as important to the firm as those 
of the individual who received the bonus. The second group 
includes those who contributed to the activity that was the 
basis for the award but who did not receive part of the 
bonus. As a result, prior teamwork and cooperation involving 
the bonus recipient would at least be curtailed. Even worse, 
the teamwork could be replaced by internal competition. 
The problems with an individual incentive bonus could 
be reduced by making the award privately. The recipient would 
have to be asked to keep the award confidential, which is 
probably unlikely in most instances. However, assuming that 
the bonus did remain confidential, then the employee who made 
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an extraordinary contribution to the firm would receive a 
reinforcing acknowledgment by the company, but his or her 
fellow employees would not have the unwanted negative 
reactions. 
B. Supplemental Bonus 
As previously discussed, supplemental bonuses are really 
either in lieu of base salary or a disguised incentive bonus. 
A supplemental bonus that is in lieu of salary is compatible 
with the Deming philosophy because, like most raises, it would 
be given privately. Therefore, it would not stimulate un-
wanted negative behavior by fellow employees. 
To the extent that the recipient considers a supplemental 
bonus to be a disguised incentive bonus, then it is subject to 
the analysis in the next subsection. 
c. Incentive Bonus 
1. Individual Incentive 
Individual incentive bonus plans are not compatible 
with the Deming philosophy for several reasons. They tend to 
promote internal competition, which violates the first Deming 
principle, and to be divisive, which is contrary to the Deming 
goal of building teamwork. Also, most individual incentive 
bonus plans are quantity-oriented, usually at the expense of 
quality (Verespej 1988, p. 41). 
If an employee earned an incentive bonus by meeting a 
certain work standard or goal, production beyond that level 
would be limited for the reasons discussed in conjunction with 
the fourth Deming principle--avoid numerical quotas and 
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goals. Specifically, if the employee continued to earn a 
larger bonus based on the amount of production in excess of 
the standard, there would still be an incentive for the best 
workers to limit production either due to peer pressure or 
fear that management would raise the threshold for the 
incentive bonus. 
2. Small Group Incentive 
Small group incentive bonus plans do not promote 
competition between individuals but they still may cause compe-
tition between groups. If so, that would be divisive and 
would thwart efforts to promote teamwork. Similarly, if the 
small group incentive bonuses have numerical quotas or goals, 
they will have the same problems as individual incentive 
plans. For these reasons small group. incentive bonuses are 
not compatible with the Deming philosophy. 
3. Gain Sharing 
If we look at gain sharing as a large group incentive 
program, then the first Deming principle will be met if the 
group is sufficiently independent of other groups in the com-
pany that there is no chance of competition between groups. A 
gain sharing bonus plan should encourage teamwork because 
group members will be inclined to cooperate and use the minds 
of many to solve problems that will enlarge their gain sharing 
bonus (Ross, Hatcher and Ross 1989, pp 23-24; Finlay 1990). 
Whether a gain sharing plan will promote long-term 
continuous improvement is a difficult question. Historically, 
most gain sharing plans have been aimed at increasing produc-
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tivity through readily measurable criteria, which usually have 
a short-term orientation. Such gain sharing formulas are not 
compatible with the Deming philosophy. However, by carefully 
selecting the criteria in the formula, it is possible to 
promote a longer-term perspective. Examples of criteria that 
tend to have a longer-term focus are increasing the number of 
defect-free items produced, reducing the amount of scrap 
produced, reducing the statistical variability of key 
processes, and reducing the number of customers lost. Using 
financially based rather than physically based criteria will 
also help decrease the emphasis on the short term. The selec-
tion of such criteria would be highly dependent on the goals 
and culture of each individual firm. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to administer a gain 
sharing plan without having numerical formulas. However, we 
should not condemn gain sharing because it violates that sin-
gle Deming principle. Most of the problems can be resolved by 
ensuring that all criteria have an incentive for continuous 
improvement, not just meeting some threshold. Another factor 
is to use several criteria in the gain sharing formula to 
avoid having the employees focus on a single criterion at the 
expense of other factors that are critical to the business. 
For these reasons, gain sharing is not fully compati-
ble with all of the Deming principles. However, if it is 
carefully conceived and administered to make adjustments in 
the formula when it seems to be encouraging unwanted employee 
efforts, then gain sharing may be compatible with implementa-
tion of the Deming philosophy. 
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4. Profit Sharing 
The analysis of prof it sharing is similar to that of 
gain sharing. However, profit sharing is more likely than 
gain sharing to encourage long-term continuous improvement 
because its formula is financially based and payments are 
usually made only once a year. This tends to reduce the temp-
tation to work on "temporary fixes." 
5. Pay-for-Knowledge 
Because a pay-for-knowledge bonus plan has an inher-
ent focus on the individual, it is likely to generate internal 
competition. Each employee will be trying to maneuver into a 
position where it is easiest to demonstrate new skills. Fur-
thermore, an employee with a certain skill may be unlikely to 
cooperate with another employee and share that skill unless 
they can work out an agreement to trade their knowledge. 
Thus, such an environment would not be conducive to building 
teamwork. 
A pay-for-knowledge bonus plan would not violate the 
third (seek long-term continuous improvement) and fourth 
(avoid numerical quotas and goals) Deming principles. An 
employee who learns different skills would broaden his perspec-
tive and thus might be better able to offer suggestions to 
improve the company's processes. However, the company manage-
ment would also have to be receptive to, even encourage, such 
employee suggestions. Finally, there are no numerical quotas 
or goals in a pay-for-knowledge plan. 
On balance, it appears that a pay-for-knowledge plan 
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is not compatible with the Deming principles. However, this 
is a rather new form of bonus plan, so more experience should 
be gained from its use before it is dismissed from further 
consideration. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Dr. Deming made it very clear that there are a number of 
problems with the way many companies administer their per-
formance appraisal and "merit" or traditional pay systems. 
Much can be learned from those criticisms to improve the tradi-
tional pay systems. 
Dr. Deming is surprisingly silent about bonus plans. 
However, his criticisms of how traditional pay systems are 
administered, plus certain other principles of the Deming 
philosophy, provide criteria to evaluate the various types of 
bonus plans. 
Applying those criteria, leads to the conclusion the..'·. 
company-wide thank-you and profit sharing bonuses are gener-
ally compatible with the Deming philosophy. On the other 
hand, the following types of bonuses are not compatible: 
individual incentive, small group incentive and 
pay-for-knowledge. Individual thank-you, supplemental and 
gain sharing bonuses may or may not he compatible, depending 
on how they are structured and administered. 
Thus, if management decides to share improved profits with 
its employees, it may do so with either company-wide thank-you 
or profit sharing bonuses and be assured that they are not 
violating the Deming philosophy. A company may also use an 
individual thank-you, supplemental or gain sharing bonus if it 
exercises special care to ensure that it is structured and 
administered to be compatible with the Deming philosophy. 
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